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Abstract 
This paper investigates the short-term and long-term stock performance of firms that undergo 
corporate inversions. The results show that the market response to the initial inversion 
announcement differs based on the type of inversion.  Merger & Acquisition (M&A) and 
restructuring inversions are perceived positively by the market, but naked inversions do not 
generate a price response. Furthermore, acquirers in inversion-related M&A transactions 
generate a price premium that is in excess of what is typically generated by acquirers in non-
inversion M&A. In the long-run, firms that invert through naked and M&A inversions do not 
generate significant excess returns above the S&P 500. In contrast, restructured inverted firms 
generate significant excess returns of 214.53%. Collectively, however, the results suggest that 
corporate inversion alone is not an indicator of future stock returns.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate tax avoidance is a growing concern worldwide. Recent tax scandals, 
such as the Panama Papers and the Luxembourg Leaks, provide insight into the scope of 
tax avoidance and the extent to which corporations will go to lower their tax burdens. 
Corporate inversions, one of many forms of tax avoidance, are becoming increasingly 
popular in the United States (U.S.). The U.S. Treasury defines a corporate inversion as “a 
transaction through which the corporate structure of a U.S.-based multinational group is 
altered so that a new foreign corporation, typically located in a low- or no-tax country, 
replaces the existing U.S. parent corporation as the parent of the corporate group” (U.S. 
Treasury, 2002). U.S. policymakers have taken a number of actions to make corporate 
inversions more difficult, however their actions are ineffective and have unintended 
consequences, such as increased foreign investment by U.S. firms (Rao, 2015). Despite 
the recent increase in inversions, little is known about their long-term effects. My 
research provides evidence on how the market perceives corporate inversions at the initial 
announcement date and how inverted firms perform in the years following the inversion.   
As of 2014, there were over 4,300 publicly traded U.S. companies (The World 
Bank, 2016). The number of inversions up until 2014, though debatable, can be 
conservatively estimated at less than 100, approximately 40 of which have occurred since 
2013.1 The literature on tax avoidance generally tries to better understand what is referred 
to as the “under-sheltering puzzle”, i.e. why most companies choose not to actively 
                                                 
1 Compilations of inversion firms have differed on their definition of inversion and their samples. For 
example, some have classified Garmin and Carnival Corp. as inversions, while others have not. These 
firms, although they began operations in the U.S., have always been foreign incorporated. Other firms, such 
as Lyondellbasell Industries N.V., have foreign origins, but over time have increased their shareholder base 
or business presence in the U.S. Cortes et al. (2014) refer to these firms as Americanizations.  
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engage in tax avoidance strategies given the low expected costs of doing so (Weisbach, 
2002; Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). This appears to be particularly true for corporate 
inversions. The first possible explanation is that inversions are not well understood by the 
market, leaving managers with little incentive to invert. Chorvat (2015) argues that the 
market’s failure to price future returns associated with inversion provides support for the 
conclusion that the inversion decision involves private information known to corporate 
managers, but not to the market. She argues that this private information is related to 
intangibles in non-U.S. subsidiaries. An alternative explanation is that inversions are in 
fact not beneficial and any long-run excess returns can be explained by other non-
inversion factors, such as the structure of the underlying inversion transaction. The focus 
of my study is on the latter explanation of the inversion puzzle.  
 Inversions can take a number of forms, such as taxable stock transfer, M&A-
related, spin-off, asset, financial reorganization, subsidiary IPO, and ab initio2 (Desai and 
Hines, 2002; Rao, 2015). In the taxable stock transfer form of inversion, a U.S. company 
engages in a share exchange with its own subsidiary. Following the share exchange, the 
subsidiary becomes the parent company, and the U.S. company becomes a subsidiary 
(Marples & Gravelle, 2014). A number of different terms are used in the literature for the 
taxable stock transfers, including unilateral inversion (Chorvat, 2015), self-inversion 
(Hicks & James, 2014), naked inversion (Marples and Gravelles, 2015), and single 
company inversion (Cloyd, Mills, and Weaver, 2003b). An M&A inversion involves the 
acquisition of a foreign target company by a U.S. company or the acquisition of a U.S. 
                                                 
2 Ab initio is the Latin term for “from the beginning”. Firms that fall into this category have been foreign 
incorporated since their inception; however, they are or were associated with a U.S. incorporated firm.   
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target company by a foreign company, which results in the re-domiciliation of the U.S. 
company to a foreign jurisdiction (Babkin, et al., 2015). A restructuring inversion 
involves significant changes in a firm’s ownership, business, or assets and can take the 
form of either a spin-off, a financial reorganization, or a leveraged buy-out (Cortes, et al., 
2014).  
Prior research provides conflicting evidence on the market’s price response to 
inversion announcements. However, it generally fails to distinguish among the types of 
inversions. This distinction is important as prior non-inversion literature shows that 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and restructurings provide different types of 
information to the market. My results show that M&A and restructuring inversion 
announcements generate positive abnormal returns, while naked inversion 
announcements do not generate any price response. However, the returns are not 
significantly different from those earned by control firms that merged or restructured but 
did not invert.  
This paper represents the second long-run event study on corporate inversions. 
The first, Chorvat (2015), finds that inversions generate significant long-run excess stock 
returns above the S&P 500 market index and that these returns are higher for corporations 
that inverted prior to the introduction of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 7874 (s. 
7874). Pre s. 7874 inversions generated significant returns of approximately 225% above 
the market, while post s. 7874 inversions only generated long-run excess returns of 34%. 
My study differs from Chorvat (2015) in terms of the context in which inversions are 
examined and the finding of long-run excess returns. While she examines stock returns 
based on whether the inversion occurred pre- or post-s. 7874, I examine stock returns 
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based on the type of inversion. I divide inversions into three categories: naked, M&A, 
and restructuring.  
My results show that firms that invert through a naked or M&A inversion do not 
generate excess returns above the S&P 500 over periods of one and two years, and to 
December 31, 2015. In fact, M&A inverters underperform by 44% in the long-run (as of 
December 31, 2015) relative to comparable U.S. firms that acquire overseas targets in 
non-inversion M&As. In contrast, firms that invert through a restructuring generate 
significant excess returns of 215% above the S&P 500 as of December 31, 2015.  
Collectively, the results suggest that future stock returns differ based on the 
method through which a firm inverts. However, inversion alone is not an indicator of 
future stock returns. Any excess returns, whether positive or negative, are likely the result 
of other non-inversion related factors.  
My study contributes to the growing area of accounting literature on corporate 
inversions in two ways. First, I provide evidence that the market response to inversion 
announcements differs based on the type of inversion. Previous studies find contradictory 
evidence on whether the market prices inversion announcements. Second, I answer the 
call for research on the long-term effects of inversion, as proposed by Hanlon & 
Hetizman (2010), and address the phenomenon of the “under-sheltering puzzle”.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
background information, including the expected benefits and costs of inversion, and the 
history of inversions in the U.S. Section 3 reviews the relevant previous and concurrent 
literature. Section 4 discusses the data and sample collection procedures. Section 5 
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describes the models and variables. Section 6 presents the results. Finally, section 7 
concludes and provides a discussion of the findings and implications.  
2. Background 
2.1 Expected Benefits of Inversion 
 Most developed countries today have territorial tax systems. The United States is 
one of only 6 countries in the world that has a worldwide system (Pomerleau, 2015). 
Under a territorial system, corporations are subject to taxation on active business income 
only in the source country (i.e. the country in which the income is earned). A tax liability 
on foreign earnings is not incurred in the country of residence. Earnings repatriated from 
foreign subsidiaries through dividends are also not subject to taxation in the country of 
residence (Matheson, et al., 2013).  
 Under a worldwide system, corporations are subject to taxation in their country of 
residence on income earned anywhere in the world. The tax liability in the home country 
is offset, by a deduction or credit, for taxes paid to foreign source countries on the same 
income (Matheson, et al., 2013). Some countries, such as the U.S., allow corporations to 
defer taxation on earnings of foreign subsidiaries until they are repatriated (Matheson, et 
al., 2013). The unrepatriated foreign earnings are designated as permanently reinvested 
earnings (PRE) and corporations can defer recognition of a U.S. tax expense (Edwards, et 
al., 2012).  
 The U.S. corporate tax rate, at 35%, is currently one of the highest in the world. 
As a result, a U.S.-owned company may end up paying more in taxes than another 
identical U.S. company that is foreign owned (Mider & Drucker, 2016). The current U.S. 
tax system makes U.S. firms less competitive in a global market where their competitors 
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are only subject to territorial taxation (Seida and Wempe, 2004). Consequently, U.S. 
firms employ strategies, such as corporate inversions, to minimize their taxes (Jeffers, 
2014) (Schmidt, et al., 2015).  
 Through corporate inversion, U.S. companies relocate their headquarters to 
foreign jurisdictions, which substantially reduces their tax liabilities. Firms claim that 
inversion allows them to save U.S. taxes on foreign-sourced earnings (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010). Seida and Wempe (2004) find that effective tax rates decline from 
32.01% to 20.44% post-inversion. This reduction in taxes results in greater after-tax cash 
flows and is expected to increase shareholder value.  
2.2 Costs of Inversion 
There are costs associated with corporate inversions, both at the firm and 
shareholder levels. Since inversion, in general, does not change the operational structure 
of a firm and usually management remains within the U.S., corporate level costs are 
indirect. Inverted firms may face reputational and political costs, such as unfavorable 
press coverage and increased attention from legislators and policymakers (Seida and 
Wempe, 2002).  Inverted corporations are often labelled as “unpatriotic” or “poor 
corporate citizens”, and thereby potentially face consumer and taxpayer backlash. This 
can be especially costly for firms that deal directly with consumers (Col and Errunza, 
2015). In April of 2014, U.S. pharmaceutical giant, Walgreens, announced that it was 
considering re-domiciling to Switzerland. In the following months, Walgreens was 
publicly shamed through protests by advocacy groups (Staggs, 2014), and criticized by 
politicians, such as Illinois Senator Dick Durbin who called Walgreens’ decision a 
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“positively un-American tax dodge” (Sweeney, 2015). In August of 2014, Walgreens 
gave in to the pressure and decided against the inversion.  
Inversions may also generate costs at the shareholder level. Post-inversion, many 
firms choose to relocate their headquarters in tax haven countries, where shareholders 
have fewer legal rights than in the U.S. For example, Bermuda imposes limitations on 
legal action against corporate executives and directors (Seida and Wempe, 2002), which 
makes it more difficult to remove entrenched and inefficient management (Col and 
Errunza, 2015). Inversion also generates tax costs to shareholders. Generally, incurring 
taxes on capital gains is an inevitable consequence of holding a company’s shares.3 
However, corporate inversions do not allow shareholders to choose the timing of this tax. 
Under IRC section 367(a), U.S. shareholders are treated as if they sold their shares and 
then repurchased them in the new merged entity. The shareholders are therefore liable for 
capital gains tax on the “sale” at the time of the inversion (Gunn and Lys, 2015).  
2.3 The U.S. History of Corporate Inversions 
 The U.S. Congress has mostly taken a reactive approach to corporate inversions. 
Wells (2014) even described the inversion experience in the U.S. as a game of “whack-a-
mole”: “We enact laws and change regulations to whack the inversion mole in the middle 
of its head. But soon after, another inversion mole pops up in a slightly different place. 
We then whack that mole, too. And the game continues — again and again, without 
resolution. We do not see the futility in this game because we cannot accept that our 
responses to the corporate inversion phenomenon are wrong.” (Wells, 2014) 
                                                 
3 Assuming that the price of the shares increases from the date of purchase. 
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 The first corporate inversion occurred in 1982, more than three decades ago, when 
Louisiana-based construction company, McDermott Inc., re-domiciled to Panama. 
McDermott Inc. operated a wholly-owned holding company, McDermott International, in 
Panama through which it booked its foreign earnings, which had become substantial 
(Rao, 2014). To avoid tax on the repatriation of the foreign earnings to the U.S., 
McDermott Inc. chose to relocate its headquarters to Panama. Shareholders of 
McDermott Inc. exchanged their shares for cash and newly issued shares of McDermott 
International. Upon completion of the transaction, McDermott International was the 
parent company and McDermott Inc. was its U.S. subsidiary (Hwang, 2015). The 
transaction was not taxable to the corporation. In response to this inversion, Congress 
adopted IRC s. 1248(i) in 1986, under which consideration received in a stock exchange 
from a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) is taxable to the U.S. corporation (Henry, 
2014). A major loophole in s. 1248(i) was that it was not applicable when a company 
inverted into a subsidiary of a newly formed controlled foreign corporation (CFC) (Hicks 
& James, 2014).  
 The second U.S. company to invert was Texas-based consumer-products 
company Helen of Troy which re-domiciled to Bermuda in 1994. Helen of Troy exploited 
the loophole in s. 1248(i) by inverting into a newly formed CFC in Bermuda (Hicks & 
James, 2014). The IRS responded to the Helen of Troy inversion by issuing Treasury 
Regulations under IRC s. 367(a) in 1996. Unlike s. 1248(i), which targeted inverted 
corporations, s. 367(a) imposed taxes on the shareholders of inverting corporations. 
Under s. 367(a) regulations, gains on transfers to a foreign corporation would be taxable 
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to the shareholders of the inverting U.S. firm if the shareholders owned at least 50% of 
the new firm after the inversion, while losses would not be deductible (Henry, 2014).  
 Following the inversions of McDermott and Helen of Troy, a number of other 
U.S. companies inverted through shares exchanges between the late 1990s and the early 
2000s, primarily to Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. Deterring inversions by imposing 
shareholder level taxes under s. 367(a) proved ineffective as significant stock in inverting 
firms was often held by tax-exempt institutional investors.  
 Congress responded to this wave of inversions with s. 7874 of the American Jobs 
Creation Act in 2004. Under s. 7874(a), an inverted firm is subject to U.S. corporate taxes 
on certain asset transfers and licenses for a period of 10 years if it meets certain criteria. 4 
Under s. 7874(b), if the former shareholders of the U.S. firm own at least 80% of the new 
inverted firm post-inversion, the inverted firm is treated as a domestic U.S. firm for tax 
purposes (Rao, 2015).  
 Inversion activity initially subsided in the U.S. following the introduction of s. 
7874, until companies found yet another way to circumvent the law. A new wave of 
inversions began in the late 2000s and continues to this day. This new generation of 
inversions differs significantly from past ones. Companies now are inverting to European 
destinations, such as Switzerland and Ireland.  
 The method of inversion has also changed significantly post-s. 7874. Prior to s. 
7874, U.S. firms inverted through the “naked inversion” method, whereby they would set 
                                                 
4 The three criteria are: 
1) a foreign corporation acquires substantially all of the assets of a domestic corporation 
2) after the acquisition, former shareholders of the target firm own at least 60% of the foreign firm 
3) after the acquisition, the firm does not have “substantial business activities” in the foreign jurisdiction 
(Rao, 2015)  
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up a subsidiary in the target country and subsequently exchange shares with the 
subsidiary so that the subsidiary would become the new parent. S. 7874 made inversion 
under this method exceedingly difficult (Marian, 2015), so U.S. firms started to invert 
through merger and acquisition. In the M&A form of inversion, a U.S. firm acquires a 
small foreign firm that is located in a low tax jurisdiction or a U.S. corporation is 
acquired by a larger foreign corporation in a low tax jurisdiction (Marples & Gravelle, 
2014).  
  Some U.S. companies have inverted, both pre- and post-s. 7874, through non-
traditional methods of inversion that involve a corporate restructuring, such as spinoffs 
and leveraged buyouts. These restructurings result is material changes in the company’s 
business, assets, or ownership (Cortes, et al., 2014). 
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Short-term Performance 
 The empirical literature on corporate inversions provides conflicting evidence of 
stock market reactions to inversion announcements. There are compelling arguments on 
whether the market should react positively or negatively. On one hand, inversions may 
reduce taxes and increase cash flows, thereby increasing shareholder wealth. Hanlon and 
Slemrod (2009) argue that shareholders want to minimize corporate tax payments and 
that an aggressive tax strategy makes a company’s shares more attractive. This suggests 
that a positive market reaction should be observed to corporate inversion announcements.  
 Alternatively, as discussed previously, inversions can generate significant costs at 
the corporate and shareholder levels, such as political scrutiny, consumer backlash, and 
tax costs. In addition, tax avoidance activity may lead to uncertainty about the volatility 
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of the firms’ future profits (Shevlin, et al., 2013). This suggests that the market will react 
negatively, if the costs at the corporate and shareholder level outweigh expected future 
tax benefits, or that the market will not react at all, if the costs are proportional to 
expected future tax benefits.  
3.1.1 Literature Review 
 In the early 2000s, a number of studies were conducted on the short-term price 
reaction to corporate inversion announcements, with mixed results. Using a sample of 19 
inversions announced between 1993 and 2002, Desai and Hines (2002) find that the stock 
price reaction to the initial inversion announcement is positive and that, on average, stock 
prices rise approximately 1.7% in the five-day window around the announcement date, 
although they do not assess the statistical significance of the observed returns. 
 The initial inversion announcement date is generally the date that the board of 
directors approve the proposed inversion. It is also the date on which the proposed 
inversion is publicly announced. Following board approval, the proposed inversion 
transaction must be approved by shareholders, which typically occurs 8 to 12 months 
later. Using a sample of 19 inversions that were approved between 1994 and 2002, Seida 
and Wempe (2002; 2003) do not find any evidence of a stock price reaction around the 
initial announcement date. However, they find statistically significant average 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of 2.5% over a three-day window centered on the 
shareholder approval date.  
 In a follow up study, Cloyd, Mills, and Weaver (2003a) caution against using the 
shareholder approval date to assess the market reaction as there is little to no uncertainty 
that shareholders will approve the inversion transaction. Investors would anticipate this 
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and expected value of the inversion would be impounded into the stock price upon board 
approval. Cloyd, Mills, and Weaver (2003a) replicate Seida and Wempe (2002)’s study 
and test the significance of the shareholder approval date CARs for each firm 
individually. Only four firms have significant positive returns.  
 These early studies do not distinguish between the different types of inversions 
and they group all inversions into a single category to assess the market reaction. Cloyd, 
Mills, & Weaver (2003b) are the first to assess returns for naked and M&A inversions 
separately, stating that the returns to M&A inversions may be confounded by other non-
inversion factors, such as the valuation implications for the merger itself. Their M&A 
sample consists of only five M&A inversion announcements, all of which were 
announced prior to s. 7874. Cloyd, Mills, and Weaver (2003b) find two- and five-day 
CARs of -1.91% and -1.72%, respectively, for the naked sample. Five of the 20 firms 
have significant negative returns and two have significant positive returns. The average  
return across the sample are not significant. The two- and five-day CARs to M&A 
inversion announcements are -4.19% and -0.51%, respectively. Three of the five 
announcements have significant negative returns. The authors conclude that there is no 
compelling evidence that the market responds positively to inversion announcements and 
this suggests that the benefits of inversion are either not obvious to investors or that they 
are offset by other costs.  
 Babkin et al. (2015) further classify M&A transactions based on whether the 
inverting U.S. firm is the acquirer or target firm in the merger transaction. Their sample 
of inversion announcements ranges from 1983 to 2014, and includes 25 naked and 48 
M&A inversions. Of the 48 M&A inversions, 31 are U.S. acquirer and 17 are U.S. target 
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firms. The mean and median announcement period (t-2, t+3) returns for naked inversions 
are -2.53% and -0.73%, respectively. M&A inversion announcements generate positive 
returns. The mean and median returns to U.S. acquirer firms are 4.92% and 1.59%, 
respectively. The mean and median returns to U.S. target firms are 16.96% and 16.64%, 
respectively. Finally, the mean and median returns across all announcements, naked and 
M&A, are 0.77% and 0.52%. Babkin et al. (2015) do not assess the statistical 
significance of the returns. 
 Taken together, prior studies suggest that the market reaction to inversion 
announcements differs based on the structure of the proposed inversion and is also 
influenced by other factors related to the said structure. To the best of my knowledge, 
prior inversion literature has not assessed the market response for restructuring inversion 
announcements separately. My research addresses this gap in the literature. 
 The literature on restructurings suggests that the market reacts positively to 
restructuring announcements. Eckbo and Thornburn (2008) provide a comprehensive 
review of prior literature on corporate restructurings and abnormal returns based on a 
review of 19 studies of 2,052 corporate spinoffs announced between 1962 and 2000; and 
4 studies on leveraged buyouts (LBOs) conducted between 1984 and 2007. They find that 
corporate spinoffs, generally, are a source of value creation. This value creation is driven 
by a number of factors, including increased corporate focus and corporate governance, 
and reduced negative synergies, resulting from the elimination of unrelated divisions. 
Spinoff announcements generate positive price reactions of 1.7% to 5.6%. 
Announcements of LBOs are also received positively by the market. Value creation in 
LBOs is driven by increases in operating efficiencies, such as improved managerial 
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investment decisions, mitigation of agency problems, and lower taxes. LBO 
announcements generate two-day CARs of 16 to 17%.  
3.1.2 Research Predictions 
 Consistent with prior literature, I predict that the short-term market response to 
the initial inversion announcement will differ based on the type of inversion. Naked 
inversion announcements will not generate a price response. M&A inversion 
announcements will generate a positive price response. Finally, restructuring inversion 
announcements will generate a positive price response. I also examine whether returns to 
inversion M&As and restructurings are in excess of returns typically generated by non-
inversion M&As and restructurings. If returns are truly driven by the underlying 
transaction and not inversion, then the returns generated by inversion announcements 
should not be in excess of returns generated by similar types of announcements that are 
not inversion related. Stated formally, my first three predictions are: 
Prediction 1: Announcements of naked inversions will not generate a price response 
Prediction 2: Announcements of M&A inversions will generate a positive price 
response, but not in excess of that generated by non-inversion M&A announcements.  
Prediction 3: Announcements of restructuring inversions will generate a positive price 
response, but not in excess of that generated by non-inversion restructurings.  
3.2 Long-term Performance  
 The empirical literature on the long-term performance of inverted firms is sparse. 
The inconclusive evidence in prior studies of a short-term market reaction suggests the 
need to study the effects of inversion in the long-term. Assuming market efficiency, the 
long-term effects of inversion should be priced around the initial announcement date. 
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However, given the significant costs and uncertainty of corporate inversions, there is the 
risk that expected future tax benefits will not be realized. As a result, actual firm 
performance may differ from ex-ante expectations (Lusch, et al., 2016). 
3.2.1 Literature Review 
 Cloyd, Mills, and Weaver (2003) are the first to investigate stock returns in the 
period following the inversion announcement. They examine one, two, and six month 
post-inversion announcement returns for 20 single company inversions announced 
between 1982 and 2002, and find average returns of -0.02%, 4.40%, and 4.07%, 
respectively. Only about half of the firms have positive returns in each window. The 
returns are not statistically significant.  
 In a concurrent study, Lusch et al. (2016) examine excess buy-and-hold returns 
for 10 pre-s. 7874 naked inverters over one-, two-, three-, five, and 10-year periods. The 
results suggest that inverters do not generate excess returns relative to their non-inverted 
competitors. Lusch et al. (2016) also assess long-term performance using accounting-
based financial measures and find that inverters have lower pretax and after-tax earnings 
performance relative to their non-inverted competitors.  
A recent report from Bloomberg analyzes the performance of 14 firms that have 
inverted through M&A between 2010 and 2013 (Sutherland, 2014). The median excess 
return to the sample is 14.60% above the MSCI World Index. Examining the 
performance of each firm individually, however, shows that only 8 of the 14 firms 
outperform the market. At least half of the M&A inversions in the sample are announced 
in either 2013 or 2014, and thus the analysis of these firms uses less than one year of 
data. Furthermore, at the time of the analysis the inversion deal for four of the firms was 
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still pending and two of those deals were eventually cancelled. The report does not assess 
the statistical significance of the returns.   
A 2014 report from Reuters examines the long-term returns of 52 U.S. companies 
that inverted through naked and M&A inversions between 1983 and 2014. Results show 
that many inverted companies have not produced above-average long-term returns for 
investors (Drawbaugh, 2014). Of the 52 companies, 19 earn returns above the S&P 500, 
19 underperform the S&P 500, 10 are acquired by other firms, three go bankrupt, and one 
reincorporates back in the U.S.5 Companies in the oilfield and engineering sectors have 
the poorest performance; not only do they underperform relative to the S&P, but also 
relative to sector matched indices. Similar to the Bloomberg report, the significance of 
the returns is not assessed. 
Chorvat (2015) studies post-inversion announcement returns for firms that 
inverted pre- and post-s. 7874. She finds that firms that inverted prior to s. 7874 generate 
five-year excess returns of 61.71% above the S&P 500 and long-run returns of 224.70% 
as of March 1, 2013. Firms that inverted post-s. 7874 generate excess returns of 34.26% 
as of March 1, 2015. The returns for both pre- and post-s. 7874 inversions are significant. 
Her sample includes 21 pre-s. 7874 announcements and 21 post-s. 7874 announcements. 
Chorvat (2015), however, does not assess performance separately for naked and M&A 
inversions.  
 Overall, except for Chorvat (2015), prior studies suggest that inversions do not 
generate long-run excess returns. To explain this lack of results, some have argued that 
                                                 
5 Xoma returned to the U.S. in 2010. 
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corporate inversion is not an indicator of performance. For example, Drawbaugh (2014) 
states, “inversions, on their own, despite largely providing the tax savings that companies 
seek, are no guarantee of superior returns for investors”. Others believe that in pursuing a 
corporate inversion, companies make poor strategic decisions, and subsequently suffer 
from operational inefficiencies. Companies may base their inversion decision solely on 
tax benefits rather than on economic fundamentals (Winegarden, 2016). Likewise, they 
might pursue merger targets that are not a good strategic fit when inverting through M&A 
(Friedman, 2014).  
 To the best of my knowledge, there has been no attempt made to determine 
whether the observed differences in results could be driven by the underlying structure of 
the inversion transaction. Yet, just like for short-term returns, it is possible that inverted 
firms do not generate long-run returns in excess of what is generated by similar non-
inverted firms. Any observed excess returns, supposedly from inversion, are likely the 
result of other, non-inversion related factors, such as M&A or corporate restructuring. If 
this assumption holds, then firms that invert through M&A and restructuring will have 
returns consistent with returns documented in the M&A and restructuring literature.  
 There is extensive M&A literature that shows firms perform poorly in the years 
following an M&A.6 Agrawal et al. (1992) examine the performance of mergers by U.S. 
listed firms from 1955-1987 and find that M&A firms earn significantly negative excess 
returns of 10% for up to five years post-merger. Loughran and Vijh (1997) look at 947 
acquisitions between 1970 and 1989 and also find that stock mergers earn negative 
excess returns of 25% in the five years following the merger. A number of other studies 
                                                 
6 For a review of the literature, see Agrawal & Jaffe (2000) 
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also provide similar evidence (Conn et al., 2005; Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Ma et al., 
2009). 
 In contrast, prior studies suggest that firms have positive long-run performance 
following a restructuring.7 Kirchmaier (2003) examines the long-term stock performance 
of 41 spinoffs that occurred between 1989 and 1999 and finds excess returns of 17.30% 
in the 780 trading days following the spinoff announcement. McConnell and 
Ovtchinnikov (2004) study post-spinoff performance for 311 firms between 1965 and 
2000 and find significant excess returns of 26.32% in the 36 months following the 
spinoff. Patel et al. (2012) examine the stock performance of spinoff firms for the period 
1995 through 2011. They find that spinoff firms outperform the S&P 500 for 12 months 
following the date on which the spinoff was completed.   
 Prior literature also provides evidence of positive excess returns to firms backed 
by private equity firms. Mian & Rosenfeld (1993), using a sample of 48 reverse LBOs 
between 1983 and 1988, find three-year excess returns of 24.73%. Drathen and Faleiro 
(2007) analyze 86 LBO-backed IPOs between 1990 and 2006, and find five-year excess 
returns of 22.15%. Antonsson and Palmer (2012) find excess returns of 26.19% for a 
sample of 17 reverse LBO between 1981 and 2007.  
3.2.2 Research Predictions 
 If inversion is not an indicator of future performance and the returns to inverted 
firms are comparable to those of similar non-inverted firms, then long-run performance 
will differ among the types of inversions. Naked inversions will not generate long-run 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive review of the literature, including market response and long-run performance, see 
(Bowman, et al., 1999), (Brauer, 2006), and (Lee & Madhavan, 2010). 
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excess returns. M&A inversions will generate negative excess returns. Restructuring 
inversions will generate positive excess returns. Furthermore, the returns to all firms will 
not differ significantly from returns to matched non-inverted firms. My next three 
predictions are as follows: 
Prediction 4: Firms that invert through a naked inversion will not generate excess long-
term returns above the S&P 500 or above comparable firms that do not invert.  
Prediction 5: Firms that invert through M&A will generate excess long-term returns 
below the S&P 500. However, the returns will be similar to other firms that undergo 
M&A for non-inversion reasons.  
Prediction 6: Firms that invert through a restructuring will generate excess long-term 
returns above the S&P 500. However, the returns will be similar to other non-inverion 
restructured firms.  
4. Sample and Data 
4.1 Sample 
 To enter the sample, a firm must announce a proposed inversion. Sample firms 
are first identified from prior studies cited above. To make sure more recent inversions 
are included in the sample, I then use Bloomberg’s “Tracking Tax Runaways” list, and 
data compiled by the Congressional Research Service8. Data was last retrieved in August 
of 2015. The initial sample consists of 100 inversions. All inversions are then cross-
referenced with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings obtained from 
                                                 
8 http://www.bloomberg.com/infographics/2014-09-18/tax-runaways-tracking-inversions.html 
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/press-release/new-crs-data-47-corporate-inversions-last-decade-
2 
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EDGAR to confirm the announcement date and whether the proposed transaction was 
completed. Firms that cancelled the proposed inversion, inversions that are still pending, 
and firms that are not listed are removed from the sample, leaving a total of 80 inversions 
announcements. An additional 24 firms are removed because they have less than 24 
months of stock price data following the inversion announcement or they are traded in 
over-the-counter (OTC) markets. The final sample consists of 56 firms.  
 Sample inversion transactions are then classified as either naked, M&A, or 
restructuring. Consistent with Marples and Gravelle (2015), a naked inversion is a share 
exchange between a U.S. Corporation and its foreign subsidiary that results in the foreign 
subsidiary becoming the parent corporation. It generally does not involve any changes in 
the firm’s operations, structure, or ownership make up. Consistent with Babkin et al. 
(2015), an M&A inversion occurs when a U.S. corporation incorporates in a foreign 
jurisdiction through a merger with a foreign corporation. Last, consistent with Cortes et 
al. (2014), the foreign incorporation of a spinoff or leveraged buyout is classified as a 
restructuring inversion. A restructuring transaction results in a substantial change in the 
firm’s ownership, business, or assets (Cortes, et al., 2014). SEC filings retrieved from 
EDGAR are used to classify the sample inversion transactions based on these definitions. 
I compare my classifications to that of Desai and Hines (2002); Rao (2015); and Chorvat 
(2015) to validate my interpretations. The final sample consists of 19 naked, 24 M&A, 
and 12 restructuring inversions. The sample selection procedure is summarized in Table 
1.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
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Next, I select a control firm for each sample inversion firm. Controls firms are 
selected from COMPUSTAT for naked inversions, Thomson SDC Platinum for M&A 
inversions, and Bloomberg for restructuring inversions. All sample firms are matched 
based on year, industry, and total revenues. For the naked sample, I can only identify a 
control firm for long-term stock performance because control firms do not have an event 
date on which short-term performance is assessed. Target and acquiring M&A inverters 
are matched with non-inverting targets or acquirers, respectively. Restructuring firms are 
matched with non-inverting restructured firms based on the type of restructuring 
transaction, i.e. spinoff or leverage buyout. A list of sample and matched firms is 
presented in Table 2. 
(Insert Table 2 here)  
4.2 Data 
Data to compute descriptive statistics is collected from COMPUSTAT. Short-
term event study data is obtained from CRSP. Stock price data for long-term stock 
returns is collected primarily from Yahoo Finance, which provides the adjusted closing 
price. Yahoo Finance does not include historical returns for delisted firms, including 
those firms that were acquired. Adjusted prices for these firms are calculated using 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. Stock price data is also calculated from Datastream for 
foreign acquirers and targets in the M&A control sample.  
5. Models and Variables 
5.1 Short-term Performance 
 To test the market response to the initial inversion announcement, I compute 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs), as defined by Mackinlay (1997) over 
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one-, three-, and five- day event windows.9 This approach is consistent with Cloyd et al. 
(2003). 
Abnormal return is computed as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡)     (1) 
Where: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = The actual return to sample firm i at time t, i.e. the day of the 
initial inversion announcement 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡)  = The expected return to sample firm i at time t, i.e. the day of the 
initial inversion announcement calculated from the market model 
 
The market model is defined as:  
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (2) 
Where:  
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) = The expected return to firm sample firm i at time t, i.e. the day of 
the initial inversion announcement 
𝑟𝑚,𝑡 = The return on the market at time t, i.e. the day of the initial 
inversion announcement 
 
The estimation period ranges from 220 days to 60 days prior to the announcement date.10 
                                                 
9 The event date is the initial inversion announcement date (i.e. the date of board approval).  As discussed 
by Cloyd, Mills, and Weaver (2003a), using the shareholder approval date is problematic because by that 
date information about the inversion is already known to the market and has already been impounded into 
the stock price. There is little to no uncertainty that the shareholders will approve the transaction and hence 
the market is unlikely to react.  
10 There is no uniformly accepted estimation period in event studies. As discussed by Sorokina, Booth, and 
Thornton (2013), prior studies use various estimation periods, ranging from 100 days to 500 days. In my 
analysis, I also use alternative estimation periods, i.e. 150, 200, and 250 days (not reported). However, the 
results do not change. 
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 The average abnormal return (AAR) is calculated as the simple cross-sectional 
average of the returns in the sample. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) is 
the sum of the AAR over the specified windows. The significance is tested using a 
standard two-tailed t-test.   
4.2 Long-term Performance 
 To assess the long-run performance of inversion transactions, I use the same 
approach as Chorvat (2015). I measure abnormal returns as the observed ex-post return 
on the security minus the return on a benchmark index. Following the approach of Ritter 
(1991) and Barber & Lyon (1997), I estimate the abnormal return as the cumulative 
average return to a buy and hold portfolio of the firms in my sample. Returns are defined 
as the change between the opening stock price on the day prior to the inversion 
announcement and the closing price one- and two-years post-inversion announcement 
and to December 31, 2015.  
 Unlike prior event-study literature, which generally calculates the buy-and-hold 
return as the geometric holding period return, following Chorvat (2015), I calculate the 
buy-and-hold return as the arithmetic holding period return. The geometric return mimics 
the return obtained by a day trader who purchases a security at the opening of each 
trading day and sells it as the market closes each day (Smith, 2008). In contrast, the 
arithmetic holding period return mimics the long-run returns that would have been earned 
by an investor who purchased and held the stock (Chorvat, 2015). Returns are adjusted 
for stock splits and dividends, and defined as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 =
(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡+1−𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
     (3) 
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 Following Chovart (2015), I estimate the abnormal returns using the market 
model, and use the S&P 500 as the benchmark. Buy and hold abnormal returns are 
defined as: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡     (4) 
Where: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  = The buy-and-hold abnormal return for firm i at time t 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  = The actual return to the firm i at time t 
𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡 = The return on the market index at time t 
  
 The average buy and hold abnormal return (ABHAR) is then calculated as the 
compounded equally weighted return on a portfolio of all securities in the sample: 
𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1      (5) 
The significance of ABHAR is calculated using a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t 
statistic as defined by Lyon, et al. (1999). 
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3 displays announcement years and destinations for sample firms. Bermuda 
and Cayman Islands are the most common destinations between 1999 and 2002. Most of 
these inversions are naked inversions. No inversions are announced in 2004 or 2005. This 
is consistent with a reduction in inversions in the immediate period following s. 7874. 
Post-s. 7874, the most common destinations are Ireland and the United Kingdom. Most of 
these inversions are through M&A.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
25 
 
 Table 4 presents mean and median values for market-to-book ratio (MB), 
leverage, return on assets (ROA), earnings per share (EPS), effective tax rate (ETR), cash 
effective tax rate (CETR) and the fraction of foreign pretax income to total pretax 
income, for each of the three inversion subsamples and for matched control samples. For 
the naked and M&A samples, all variables are calculated for the year prior to the 
inversion announcement. Most of the restructuring firms were private at the time of the 
inversion announcement and thus data is not available for the pre-inversion period. For 
this group, all variables are calculated for the first year the firm is listed. Significance of 
difference in means and medians is tested using a t-test and a Mann-Whitney U test, 
respectively. Significance levels are two-tailed.  
 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the naked inversion and control firms. 
Inversion firms are not significantly different from control firms in terms of MB ratios, 
leverage, ROA, EPS, ETR, and CETR. Inversion firms have, on average, higher MB 
ratios (16.96%), ROA (1.03%), EPS (24.27%), and CETR (2.13%), but lower leverage (-
2.98%) and ETR (-0.57%). Inversion firms have significantly higher mean and median 
foreign earnings of 36.57% and 33.30%, respectively (p < 0.10). This is consistent with 
the incentive to invert. Inversions allow companies to save U.S. taxes on foreign-sourced 
earnings. 
 Descriptive statistics for the M&A sample are presented in Panel B. Inverting 
acquirers are similar to non-inverting acquirers on all measures except leverage. Inverting 
acquirers are, on average, 8% more leveraged than matched non-inverting acquirers (p < 
0.05). Inverting targets differ from non-inverting targets only on ETR (p < 0.05). The 
average ETR for inverting and non-inverting targets are 14.04% and 42.66%, 
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respectively. The lower ETR of inverting target firms is consistent with U.S. acquirers 
inverting to lower their tax burdens.  
  Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the restructuring sample. Inverted firms 
have lower MB ratios and CETR, but higher ETR, EPS, ROA, and leverage. However, 
the difference between the inversion and control samples are not significant.   
 (Insert Table 4 here) 
6.2 Short-term Performance 
6.2.1 Excess Returns 
 Table 5 reports CAARs calculated over one-, three-, and five-day windows for 
sample and control firms. Outliers in the data are detected using the Tukey (1977) 
method. Observations that fall outside of 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR) are 
removed in calculating returns.11  
 Panel A of Table 5 shows CAARs for the naked sample. Two firms are removed 
due to insufficient data. The results show a negative, but insignificant price response. The 
one-, three-, and five-day CAARs are -0.65%, -1.07%, and -1.47%, respectively. The 
results support my prediction that announcements of naked inversions do not generate a 
market response. The lack of excess returns on the initial announcement date is also 
consistent with Seida and Wempe (2002). 
 Panel B displays CAARs for acquiring and target firms around M&A 
announcements for both inversion and non-inversion firms. Five transactions are further 
removed from this analysis: one with insufficient data, one merger of equals, and three 
                                                 
11 Sample returns do not differ if outliers are not removed.  
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partial mergers. Ten target firms are excluded from the sample because they are either 
privately held or are not CRSP-listed.  
 Acquirers in inversion-related M&As generate significant positive excess returns, 
while acquirers in non-inversion M&As do not. The one-, three-, and five-day returns to 
inverting acquirers in excess of the returns to non-inverting acquirers are 1.74% (not 
significant), 2.98% (not significant), and 4.06% (p < 0.10), respectively. In contrast, both 
inversion and non-inversion target firms in M&As generate significant positive abnormal 
returns. The returns to inversion target firms over one-, three-, and five-day windows are 
13.98%, 16.59%, and 17.45%, respectively. Non-inversion target firms generate returns 
of 12.87%, 15.14%, and 16.28%. All returns are significant at the 0.01 level. The 
difference in returns between inversion and non-inversion target firms is not significant. 
 The results provide partial support for my prediction that announcement returns 
do not differ between inversion and non-inversion M&As. Babkin et al. (2015) also find 
evidence of excess returns to inverting acquirers of 3.70%, however they do not test for 
statistical significance. Excess returns to inverting acquirers over non-inverting acquirers 
are likely the result of investors’ expectations of reduced future taxes post-inversion.  
 Panel C displays CAARs to restructuring inversion announcements. Six firms are 
removed from the sample because there is no indication at the time of the initial 
announcement that the transaction is an inversion. One-, three-, and five-day CAARs for 
sample firms are 10.54% (p < 0.01), 9.15% (p < 0.05), and 12.21% (p < 0.05), 
respectively. One-, three-, and five-day CAARs for control firms are 10.51% (p < 0.01), 
11.84% (p < 0.01), and 11.30% (p < 0.01). The difference in returns between inverted 
and non-inverted firms is not significant. The finding of positive excess returns is 
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consistent with Eckbo and Thornburn (2008). The findings are also consistent with my 
prediction that corporate inversions do not generate excess returns above similar non-
inversion transactions.12  
 (Insert Table 5 here) 
6.2.2 Robustness 
 Table 6 provides additional analysis of returns to M&A announcements. For this 
analysis, I use a larger sample of M&A inversion announcements, including those that 
were subsequently cancelled. Consistent with Babkin et al. (2015), I classify the 
transaction based on whether the U.S. firm is the acquirer or the target in the transaction. 
Marples and Gravelle (2015) suggest that there are two types of M&A inversions: “a U.S. 
corporation acquired by a larger foreign corporation” or “a smaller foreign corporation 
acquired by a U.S. Corporation”. An example of the former is UK based Ensco’s 
acquisition of U.S. firm Pride International. To the best of my knowledge, no prior study 
has assessed returns for both acquirer and target firms based on this distinction.  
 Panel A displays returns for transactions where a U.S. firm acquires a foreign 
firm. The results show that U.S. inverting acquirers generate significant excess returns 
above non-inverting acquirers. The one-, three-, and five-day returns to inverting 
acquirers in excess of returns non-inverting acquirers are 3.09% (p <  0.10), 3.77% (p < 
0.05), and 2.75% (not significant). Target firms generate similar returns regardless of 
whether the M&A is inversion-related.  
                                                 
12 Returns are also calculated using a market adjusted model (not reported). The returns are similar and 
results are not affected. 
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 Panel B displays returns for transactions where a foreign firm acquires a U.S. 
firm. Many of the foreign acquiring firms in Panel B are previously inverted U.S. firms 
that subsequently acquire a U.S. target. The one-, three-, and five-day returns to inverting 
foreign acquirers in excess returns to non-inverting acquirers are 4.17% (p < 0.10), 4.26% 
(not significant), and 4.16% (not significant). The returns to inverting and non-inverting 
U.S. targets are not statistically different.  
 Difference in returns is also assessed for inverting firms between the two types of 
M&A inversions (not shown). The returns to U.S. acquirers are not statistically different 
from the returns to foreign acquirers. Results are similar for foreign and U.S. targets.  
 Overall, the results are consistent with Babkin et al. (2015), who find excess 
returns to inverting acquirers of 3.70%, and excess returns to inverting targets of only 
0.28%. One explanation is that the excess returns to inverting acquirers relative to non-
inverting acquirers represents the expected inversion benefit. Expected future tax benefits 
from inversions are impounded into the stock price around the announcement date.  
(Insert Table 6 here) 
6.3 Long-term Performance  
 Table 7 provides the results of excess returns to naked inversion firms. Outliers in 
the data are detected using the Tukey (1997) method. Observations that fall outside of 1.5 
times the interquartile range (IQR) are removed in calculating returns.13 Column 1 
displays excess returns relative to the S&P 500. The results show that naked inversions 
generate excess returns of 8.09% and 21.29% over the one- and two-year periods 
                                                 
13 The following returns to December 31, 2015 are removed: Mcdermott (-1282.28%), Helen of Troy 
(1994.07%), Everest Re (698.67%), and Arch Capital (1209.54%).  
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following the inversion announcement. Excess returns as of December 31, 2015 are 
31.78%. The returns are not statistically significant. Column 2 of Table 7 displays excess 
returns relative to control firms. The one- and two-year returns are -4.04% and 1.00%, 
respectively. Excess returns as of December 31, 2015 are -48.12%. The returns are not 
statistically significant.  
  Overall, consistent with my prediction, the results provide evidence that naked 
inversions do not generate significant excess returns in the long-run above the S&P 500 
or above size and industry matched non-inverted firms. This is consistent with the 
argument that inversion alone is not an indicator of future returns.  
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 Excess returns for M&A inversions are reported in Table 8. Outliers are also 
removed using the Tukey (1977) method.14 Column 1 displays excess returns relative to 
the S&P 500. The one- and two- year excess returns are 13.46% and 29.73%, 
respectively. Long-run excess returns as of December 31, 2015 are -15.16%. The returns 
are not statistically significant. Column 2 of Table 8 displays excess returns relative to 
control firms. The one- and two- year excess returns are 3.70% and 7.60%, respectively. 
The returns are not statistically significant. Long-run excess returns as of December 31, 
2015 are -44.37% (p < 0.10).  
 Overall, consistent with my prediction, the results suggest that M&A inversions 
do not generate significant excess returns above the S&P in the long-run. Inversion-
motivated M&A firms generate negative long-run returns relative to firms that merge for 
                                                 
14 Returns to December 31, 2015 for Alkermes (396.07%) are removed. All returns for Valeant are 
removed.  
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non-inversion reasons. These results are consistent with prior literature that suggests that 
in pursuing inversions, companies make poor strategic decisions, such as merging with a 
target firm that is not a good strategic fit (Friedman, 2014).  
(Insert Table 8 here) 
 Excess returns from restructuring inversions are presented in Table 9. Outliers are 
removed using the Tukey (1977) method.15 Column 1 of Panel A displays excess returns 
relative to the S&P 500. The one- and two-year excess returns are 22.96% (not 
significant) and 85.08% (p < 0.05). Excess returns as of December 31, 2015 are 214.53% 
(p < 0.10). Excess returns relative to control firms are presented in column 2 of Table 8. 
The one- and two-year, and December 31 excess returns are -20.08%, 21.86%, and 
17.27%, respectively. The returns are not statistically significant.  
 The results provide strong evidence that firms inverting through a restructuring 
generate significantly large excess returns relative to the market, which is consistent with 
prior literature and my prediction. However, also consistent with my prediction, there is 
no evidence that inversion leads to excess returns compared to similar firms that do not 
invert.  
 (Insert Table 9 here) 
 Taken together, my results suggest that inversion alone is not an indicator of 
future stock performance. Rather, future returns depend on the structure of the underlying 
transaction.  
                                                 
15 The following returns are removed: Altisource (1 year = 290.08%; 5 year = 1045.79%) and Core Labs 
(December 31, 2015 = 3654.79%) 
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7. Conclusion 
 This study investigates the market reaction to the announcement of an inversion 
and assesses the long-run stock performance of inverted firms among three inversion 
types: naked, M&A-related, and restructuring. Short-term performance is assessed 
relative to similar non-inverted firms for M&A and restructuring inversions. Long-run 
performance is assessed relative to the S&P 500 market index and relative to similar non-
inverted firms. 
  My short-term event study results show that the market perceives inversion 
announcements differently based on type of inversion. M&A and restructuring 
announcements are perceived positively, while naked announcements do not generate a 
price response. Only M&A acquirers generate returns in excess of that of the control 
sample. The excess returns to inverting acquirers over non-inverting acquirers in M&A 
transactions suggests the presence of incremental expected benefits from the inversion 
that are being impounded into stock price. Distinguishing between transactions where a 
foreign corporation acquires a US target and transactions where a US corporation 
acquires a foreign target shows similar results for both types of transactions. These results 
are consistent with Babkin et al. (2015). 
 My long-run event-study results also show that returns differ based on the type of 
inversion. Naked and M&A inversions do not generate long-run excess returns relative to 
the market or to comparable non-inverted firms. In fact, M&A inverters significantly 
underperform relative to comparable firms. Finally, I find evidence that restructuring 
inversions outperform the market. However, the returns to these firms are not in excess of 
returns to comparable non-inverted firms.  
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 My study provides some insight to the “under-sheltering puzzle” of why only a 
small number of U.S. companies have inverted. My results provide support for the 
argument that inversion alone is not an indicator of excess future returns. On the contrary, 
in the case of M&As, inversions destroy shareholder value. Inversions generate 
significant costs and it is unclear whether post-inversion benefits offset or exceed those 
costs. Given the number of other less costly tax minimization strategies that firms can 
employ, corporate inversions may be a last resort. 
 My study has a number of limitations. First, the results of my study may be 
affected by self-selection. Sample firms choose inversion and may share common 
characteristics. Second, as discussed by Lusch et al. (2016), the inversion sample only 
includes firms that actually inverted. There is the possibility that other firms, which have 
privately discussed inverting, are included in the control samples. Third, as discussed by 
Rao (2015), the sample includes only those firms that are generally considered to be 
inverters by prior studies and credible media sources. The sample does not describe all 
firms that have expatriated from the U.S. Finally, there may be overlap between my 
inversion classifications. For instance, some M&A transactions also meet the criteria for 
a restructuring.  
 While my study provides insight into the future stock performance of firms that 
invert, little is known about other long-term effects. There are still many unanswered 
questions, such as whether firms face changes in their business activities or operations 
post-inversion, either voluntarily or due to shifts in the business environment. There is 
also uncertainty about how inverted firms perform relative to non-inverted firms on 
performance measures other than stock price. Finally, as suggested by Chorvat (2015) 
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and Babkin et al. (2015), it is unclear whether there are private costs or benefits from 
inversion, at the either the shareholder or the corporate level, that are not known to the 
market. These are some of the questions that future research can explore.  
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
 
This table summarizes the sample selection procedure. 
 
 Naked M&A Restructuring Total 
Initial Sample 34 48 18 100 
Remove:     
Unlisted  2 2 1 5 
OTC-traded  3 1   
Cancelled  3 11  14 
Pending  1  1 
Less than 24-months Stock Price Data 6 9 5 24 
Total 20 24 12 56 
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Table 2: Inversion and Control Samples 
This table presents the final samples of inverted and control firms.   
Panel A: Naked Inversions 
 
Destination A-Date Sample Firm Control Firm 
Panama Oct 28, 1982 Mcdermott Intl Aerojet Rocketdyne  
Bermuda Dec 30, 1993 Helen Of Troy  Key Tronic  
Cayman Islands Feb 08, 1996 Triton Energy  Penn West Petroleum  
Cayman Islands Jun 01, 1997 Santa Fe International  Pioneer Natural Resources  
Cayman Islands Feb 11, 1998 Fruit Of The Loom  Mohawk Industries  
Bermuda Nov 24, 1998 Xoma  Neogen  
Cayman Islands Mar 15, 1999 Transocean  Apache  
Bermuda Sep 17, 1999 Everest Re  Mercury General  
Bermuda Sep 23, 1999 White Mountains   Kansas City Life Ins  
Bermuda Jan 18, 2000 Arch Capital  National Western Life  
Bermuda Nov 29, 2000 Foster Wheeler  Jacobs Engineering  
Bermuda Jun 11, 2001 Cooper Industries  Advanced Micro Devices 
Bermuda Oct 16, 2001 Ingersoll-Rand  Emc Corp 
Bermuda Jan 02, 2002 Nabors Industries  Precision Drilling  
Cayman Islands Jan 31, 2002 Noble  Chesapeake Energy  
Bermuda Apr 05, 2002 Weatherford   Cnooc  
Canada Jun 29, 2009 Tim Hortons  Cracker Barrel Old Ctry Stor 
United Kingdom Nov 09, 2009 Ensco  Freeport-Mcmoran  
United Kingdom Jan 13, 2012 Aon  Marsh & Mclennan  
United Kingdom Feb 28, 2012 Rowan  Quicksilver Resources  
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel B: M&A Inversions 
  Sample Firms Control Firms  
Destination A-Date Acquirer Target Acquirer Target 
Bermuda Mar 17, 1997 Tyco ADT  Exxon Mobil 
Bermuda Feb 09, 1999 XL Cap Nac Re Markel  Terra Nova 
Bermuda Dec 19, 1999 Trenwick  LaSalle  Metlife Soince RE 
Bermuda Mar 14, 2007 Argonaut PXRE American Finl Grp Marketform  
Canada Jun 21, 2010 Biovail Valeant Abbott Labs STARLIMS Tech. 
Ireland May 09, 2011 Alkermes  Elan Alere  Axis-Shield  
Ireland Sep 19, 2011 Jazz  Azur  Gilead Sciences YM BioSciences 
Australia Sep 26, 2011 Tronox  Exxaro Newmont Mining  Paladin Energy  
Switzerland Mar 28, 2012 Pentair Tyco Molycorp Neo Material Tech  
Israel Apr 16, 2012 Stratasys  Objet  Cisco Systems  NDS 
Ireland May 21, 2012 Eaton  Cooper  GE Industrea  
Bermuda Jul 30, 2012 Tower Group  Canopius  Arthur Gallagher  Insurance Dialogue  
United Kingdom Feb 05, 2013 Liberty Global Virgin Media  Global Eagle Ent.  Adv. Inflight Alliance  
Ireland May 10, 2013 Actavis Warner Chil. Stryker  Trauson Holdings  
Ireland Jul 29, 2013 Perrigo  Elan  OPKO Health  Prolor Biotech 
Ireland Nov 05, 2013 Endo Health  Paladin  Clovis Oncology EOS SpA 
Ireland Mar 19, 2014 Horizon Pharma Vidara  Emergent Bio  Cangene  
Ireland Jun 16, 2014 Medtronic  Covidien  Danaher  Nobel Biocare  
Switzerland Jun 18, 2014 TE Conn. Measurement Spec. Cirrus Logic Wolfson Microelec.  
Bermuda Jun 25, 2014 C&J Energy  Nabors  TransAtlantic Pet. Stream Oil & Gas 
Netherlands Jul 14, 2014 Mylan Abbot AmerisourceBerg Profarma 
United Kingdom Oct 13, 2014 Steris Synergy  Archer Daniels  Alfred C Toepfer Intl  
Netherlands Oct 27, 2014 Wright Medical  Tornier  BioMarin Pharma  Prosensa Holding BV 
Canada Aug 26, 2014 Burger King  Tim Hortons Universal Health  Cygnet Health Care  
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Table 2 (continued)  
Panel C: Restructuring Inversions 
      
Type Destination A-Date List-Date Sample Firm Control Firm 
LBO Singapore May 07, 1990 Mar 18, 1994 Flextronics  Lexmark 
LBO Netherlands Dec 09, 1993 Sep 21, 1995 Core Labs The Hackett Group 
Sub Spin-Off Bermuda Jan 07, 1996 Aug 15, 2005 Loral Space Live Nation Ent. 
Sub IPO Netherlands Dec 17, 1996 Mar 27, 1997 Chicago B&I Schuff International 
LBO Cayman Islands Jan 26, 2000 Dec 11, 2002 Seagate Synnex 
LBO Cayman Islands Apr 10, 2002 Dec 16, 2004 Herbalife VCA Inc  
LBO Hong Kong Jan 29, 2003 Dec 15, 2011 Michael Kors Gordman Stores 
LBO Netherlands Jan 09, 2006 Mar 11, 2010 Sensata  Sciquest 
LBO Bermuda Sep 06, 2006 May 26, 2011 Freescale Semi. Inphi Corp 
Recapitalization Luxembourg Jul 05, 2007 Jun 16, 2011 Samsonite Sally Beauty Holdings 
Sub Spin-Off Luxembourg Dec 19, 2008 Aug 06, 2009 Altisource  Core Logic 
Bankruptcy United Kingdom Jul 26, 2009 Nov 17, 2011 Delphi Auto Douglas Dynamics 
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Table 3: Inversion Announcements by Year and Destination 
 
This table classifies inversion announcements by year and destination country. 
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Australia                                 1       1 
Bermuda     1 1 1 1 4 2 2 2   1 1         1   1 18 
Canada                             1 1       1 3 
Cayman Islands       1 1 1 1 1   2                     7 
Hong Kong                     1                   1 
Ireland                                 2 1 3 2 8 
Israel                                   1     1 
Luxembourg                         1 1             2 
Netherlands     1 1               1               2 5 
Panama 1                                       1 
Singapore   1                                     1 
Switzerland                                   1   1 2 
United Kingdom                             2     2 1 1 6 
Total 1 1 2 3 2 2 5 3 2 4 1 2 2 1 3 1 3 6 4 8 56 
 
46 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the inversion and control samples.  
Significance of difference in mean and median are tested using a t-test and a  
Mann-Whitney U test, respectively. ***, **, and * denote significance at the  
1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. Significance levels are based on 
two-tailed tests. 
 
Panel A: Naked Inversions 
 Sample Control Difference 
Variable(1) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
MB 2.4136 1.8817 2.2440 1.8935 0.1696 -0.0118 
Leverage 0.1963 0.1922 0.2260 0.1947 -0.0298 -0.0025 
ROA 0.0508 0.0668 0.0405 0.0589 0.0103 0.0079 
EPS 2.4259 2.2644 2.1832 1.5807 0.2427 0.6837 
ETR 0.2805 0.2841 0.2862 0.3011 -0.0057 -0.0170 
CETR 0.1386 0.1527 0.1174 0.0355 0.0213 0.1173 
% Foreign Earnings 0.5762 0.4485 0.2105 0.1155 *0.3657 *0.3330 
Panel B: M&A Inversions 
Acquirer Sample Control Difference 
Variable(1) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
MB 2.9355 2.7278 3.0661 1.3109 -0.1306 1.4169 
Leverage 0.2500 0.2374 0.1700 0.2537 **0.0801 -0.0163 
ROA -0.0040 0.0281 0.0180 0.1959 -0.0220 -0.1679 
EPS 0.7655 1.1146 1.5600 0.4236 -0.7646 0.6910 
ETR 0.2074 0.2232 0.2338 0.0091 -0.0264 0.2141 
CETR 0.1227 0.1590 0.1998 0.0576 -0.0772 0.1014 
% Foreign Earnings 0.5158 0.4651 1.3109 1.3109 -0.7951 -0.8458 
     
Target Sample Control Difference Acquirer 
Variable(1) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
MB 2.2788 2.2186 3.1802 1.8466 -0.9015 0.3721 
Leverage 0.2574 0.1700 0.2287 0.0840 0.0288 0.0860 
ROA 0.0435 0.0684 -0.0408 -0.0133 0.0843 0.0817 
EPS 0.9217 1.5617 0.0358 -0.0945 0.8859 1.6563 
ETR 0.1404 0.1583 0.4266 0.4431 **-0.2863 *-0.2848 
CETR 0.0577 0.0295 0.2050 0.2657 -0.1473 -0.2362 
% Foreign Earnings 0.6683 0.7231 0.3711 0.4276 0.2972 0.2955 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel C: Restructuring Inversions 
 Sample Control Difference 
Variable(1) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
MB 2.9422 3.0645 3.7531 3.2829 -0.8109 -0.2184 
Leverage 0.3757 0.2002 0.2960 0.1706 0.0797 0.0296 
ROA 0.1037 0.0512 0.0186 0.0255 0.0851 0.0257 
EPS 0.6054 0.5306 0.0946 0.2732 0.5109 0.2574 
ETR 0.1490 0.1996 0.1074 0.2443 0.0417 -0.0447 
CETR 0.0740 0.0571 0.1966 0.2356 -0.1225 -0.1785 
(1) Variable definitions:   
Market to Book Ratio (MB)  = 
 (Fiscal Year Closing Price * Common Shares 
Outstanding) 
Common Equity 
Leverage = 
(Long-term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) 
Total Assets 
Return on Assets (ROA) = 
Net Income 
Total Assets 
Earnings Per Share 
(EPS) 
= 
Net Income 
Common Shares Outstanding 
Effective Tax Rate (ETR) = 
Income Tax Expense 
Pretax Income 
Cash Effective Tax Rate 
(CETR) 
= 
Income Taxes Paid 
Pretax Income 
% Foreign Earnings = 
Pretax Foreign Income 
Total Pretax Income 
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Table 5: Short-term Excess Returns  
  
This table presents the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) to 
the initial inversion announcement over one-, two-, and five-day windows 
centered on the announcement date. 
 
Returns are calculated using the market model: 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
T-statistics are used to determine significance levels. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. 
  
 Predicted 
Sign 
(0,0) (-1,1) (-2,2) 
Panel A - Naked 
 
   
All (18) 
Not 
significant 
-0.51 -1.12 -1.78 
Panel B: M&A 
Acquirer- Sample (19) + ***1.42 ***3.48 ***4.85 
Acquirer- Control (19) + -0.32 0.50 0.79 
Excess 
Not 
significant 
1.74 2.98 *4.06 
     
Target- Sample (13) + ***13.98 ***16.59 ***17.45 
Target- Control (9)  + **12.87 **15.14 ***16.28 
Excess 
Not 
significant 
1.11 1.45 1.18 
Panel C: Restructuring 
Sample (6) + ***10.54 **9.15 **12.21 
Control (6) + ***10.51 ***11.84 ***11.30 
Excess 
Not 
significant 
0.03 -2.69 0.91 
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Table 6: Short-term M&A Excess Returns  
 
This table presents the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) for M&A 
inversion announcements. M&A inversions are divided based on whether the U.S. firm 
is the acquirer or target in the M&A transaction.  
 
Returns are calculated using the market model: 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
T-statistics are used to determine significance levels. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. Significance levels are based 
on two-tailed tests. 
 
Panel A: Announcement of U.S. Corporations Acquiring Foreign Corporations 
 
 U.S. Acquirer  Foreign Target  
 (0,0) (-1,1) (-2,2) (n) (0,0) (-1,1) (-2,2) (n) 
Inversion  **3.18 **4.37 **4.10 28 ***16.27 ***16.88 ***20.11 14 
Match  0.09 0.61 1.35 27 ***18.64 ***19.22 ***18.20 14 
Excess *3.09 **3.77 2.75  -2.37 -2.34 1.91  
 
Panel B: Announcements of Foreign Corporations Acquiring U.S. Corporations 
   
 Foreign Acquirer  U.S. Target  
 (0,0) (-1,1) (-2,2) (n) (0,0) (-1,1) (-2,2) (n) 
Inversion ***4.20 ***4.68 ***4.09 8 ***18.56 ***19.53 ***21.21 9 
Match 0.03 0.42 -0.07 7 ***18.48 ***20.49 ***22.26 8 
Excess *4.17 4.26 4.16  0.08 -0.96 -1.05  
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Table 7: Long-term Excess Returns for Naked Inversions 
 
This table examines the long-run excess returns generated by firms that inverted through the 
naked method. Returns are reported for 1-, and 2- year periods following the initial inversion 
announcement and as of December 31, 2015. Column (1) displays excess returns to inverted 
firms relative to the S&P 500. Column (2) displays excess returns to inverted firms relative to 
matched control firms. 
 
Returns are calculated using buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR): 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡 
 
Significance levels are determined using bootstrapped t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. Significance levels are 
based on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
 (1) Benchmark: S&P 500 (2) Benchmark: Control Firms 
         
Sample Firm 
Predicted 
Sign 
1 Year 2 Year 
Dec 31, 
2015 
Predicted 
Sign 
1 Year 2 Year 
Dec 31, 
2015 
McDermott   0.0647 0.0115   -0.3710 -0.2582  
Helen of Troy  0.1122 0.0344   -0.1605 0.0186  
Triton Energy1  -0.3612 -1.0181   -1.0912 -1.6881  
Santa Fe Intl  -0.2561 -0.8651   0.1217 -0.1559  
Fruit of the Loom  -0.6438 -1.3372 -2.0299  -1.0679 -1.2201 -8.4193 
Xoma Corp.   -0.3607 1.6501 -1.6972  -0.2997 1.4916 -2.8360 
Transocean   0.5690 1.0513 -1.0705  -0.2508 0.2098 -3.6063 
Everest Re   0.5509 1.2745 6.9867  0.5516 0.9154 4.7328 
White Mtn  0.4501 1.6122 4.2913  0.5507 1.6962 3.6813 
Arch Capital   0.0944 0.8760   -0.5045 0.3672 9.4988 
Foster Wheeler1  0.3242 -0.3244   -0.3093 -1.0137  
Cooper1   0.3365 0.2860   1.0260 1.0727  
Ingersoll-Rand   0.0897 0.5803 2.4660  0.6997 0.6020 1.4138 
Nabors   0.3314 0.3067 -1.2170  -0.0307 -0.4778 -1.0661 
Noble Corp  0.3284 0.1966 -0.8202  -0.0505 -0.9655 -0.7676 
Weatherford   0.0641 -0.0960 -1.0704  -0.0320 -0.9579 -7.1973 
Tim Hortons   0.0907 0.1907   -0.6558 -0.6626  
Ensco  -0.0472 0.0016 -1.4720  -0.3856 -0.1062 -1.1910 
AON Plc   0.1019 0.3420 0.4903  -0.0534 -0.2766 -0.4533 
Rowan   -0.2204 -0.5160 -1.0431  0.4539 -0.0887 -0.0449 
Average 
Not 
significant 
0.0809 
(0.0721) 
0.2129 
(0.1793) 
0.3178 
(0.7613) 
Not 
significant 
-0.0404 
(0.1165) 
0.0100 
(0.1920) 
-0.4812 
(1.2604) 
 
1Returns as of December 31, 2015 returns are not computed for these firms because they were acquired. 
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Table 8: Long-Run Excess Returns for M&A Inversions 
 
This table examines the long-run excess returns generated by firms that inverted through the 
M&A method. Returns are reported for 1- and 2-year periods following the initial inversion 
announcement and as of December 31, 2015. Column (1) displays excess returns to inverted 
firms relative to the S&P 500. Column (2) displays excess returns to inverted firms relative to 
matched control firms. 
 
Returns are calculated using buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR): 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡 
 
Significance levels are determined using bootstrapped t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. Significance levels based 
on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
   
 (1) Benchmark: S&P 500 (2) Benchmark: Control Firms 
         
Sample Firm 
Predicted 
Sign 
1 Year 2 Year 
Dec 31, 
2015 
Predicted 
Sign 
1 Year 
2 Year 
Dec 31, 
2015 
Tyco  0.5169 0.9111 -1.0121  0.3400 0.6169  
XL Capital  -0.4102 0.2489 -0.6406  -0.2600 0.1580  
Trenwick   0.5337 -0.0011 -1.4383  0.5775 -0.1490 -2.6686 
Argonaut  -0.5750 -0.8005 -0.7556  -0.3611 -0.6873 -2.8571 
Alkermes   0.2438 0.8560   0.7133 1.2018  
Jazz   0.0837 0.6954 1.5964  -0.7596 -1.0364 -0.0898 
Tronox   -0.1347 -0.3520 -1.5874  -0.0024 -0.0871 -0.9374 
Pentair  0.0455 0.4159 -0.3082  0.7957 1.2246 0.6910 
Stratasys   0.8950 1.3648 -0.8391  0.7677 1.2340 -1.3576 
Eaton   0.3682 0.3623 -0.2149  0.0656 0.0618 -0.8412 
Tower Group1   -0.0435 -1.1897   -0.3151 -1.5224  
Liberty Global  -0.0143 0.0170 -0.1731  0.0838 -0.0811 -0.0458 
Actavis  0.6818 1.5241 1.6692  0.3708 0.9510 1.0641 
Perrigo   -0.0051 0.2097 -0.1224  -0.6051 -0.6884 -1.0186 
Endo Health   0.4354 0.1970 0.2467  0.4029 0.6236 0.4982 
Horizon Pharma  0.4399  0.3845  0.2800 -0.6036 -0.3977 
Medtronic   0.4257  0.5921  0.1917  0.3275 
TE Conn.  0.0441  0.0030  -0.4465 -0.2557 
C&J Energy   -0.6518  -0.8977  0.0131  -0.0547 
Mylan  0.3271  0.0214  -0.4664  -0.6261 
Steris  0.1518  0.2884  0.0354  0.4263 
Wright Medical   -0.2297  -0.0154  -0.3418  -0.2067 
Burger King   -0.0323  0.0206  -0.2288  -0.0799 
Average - 
0.1346 
(0.0764) 
0.2973 
(0.1885) 
-0.1516 
(0.1804) 
Not 
significant 
0.0370 
(0.0890) 
0.0760 
(0.2075) 
*-0.4437 
(0.2210) 
 
1Returns as of December 31, 2015 returns are not computed for these firms because they were acquired. 
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Table 9: Long-Run Excess Returns for Restructuring Inversions 
 
This table examines the long-run excess returns generated by firms that inverted through a 
restructuring. Returns are reported for 1- and 2-year periods following the initial listing date 
and as of December 31, 2015. Column (1) displays excess returns to inverted firms relative to 
the S&P 500. Column (2) displays excess returns to inverted firms relative to matched control 
firms. 
 
Returns are calculated using buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR): 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡 
 
Significance levels are determined using bootstrapped t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively.  Significance levels are 
based on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
   
 (1) Benchmark: S&P 500 (2) Benchmark: Control Firms 
         
Company 
Predicted 
Sign 
1 Year 2 Year 
Dec 31,  
2015 
Predicted 
Sign 
1 Year 2 Year 
Dec 31, 
2015 
Loral Space  -0.0802 0.2294 -0.2281  -1.1115 -0.1946 -1.4926 
Chicago B&I  -0.4617 -1.0113 7.3037  -1.2433 -0.7608 1.3398 
Altisource    3.3385 1.9229    0.8301 
Flextronics   -0.1554 0.9593 1.8458  -0.3233 0.5233 -0.6870 
Core Labs  0.1549 1.3488   0.1549 0.6940  
Seagate  0.4973 0.1881 2.0595  -0.0162 0.0595  
Herbalife  1.0595 1.5775 6.8112  -0.0377 -0.0919 0.1723 
Sensata   0.6282 0.5460 0.7128  0.5492 0.1067 0.6557 
Michael Kors  0.9777 1.9763 0.0304  0.3631 1.4007 0.6463 
Freescale Semi.  -0.4529 -0.3693 0.4511  -0.1797 0.0971 -0.2776 
Samsonite  -0.0880 0.1639 0.1980  -0.5433 -0.3068 -0.3912 
Delphi Auto  0.4463 1.2626 2.4910  0.1026 0.8780 0.9314 
Average + 
0.2296 
(0.1560) 
**0.8508 
(0.3317) 
*2.1453 
(0.7337) 
Not 
Significant 
-0.2078 
(0.1614) 
0.2186 
(0.1747) 
0.1727 
(0.2610) 
 
